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1.1 An Introduction to Expressivity
This thesis is about logic and in particular about the expressivity1 of different logics.
Informally speaking, expressivity is a measure of what can be said (or expressed) in a
logic. A logic L2 is at least as expressive as a logic L1, denoted L1  L2, if everything
that can be said in L1 can also be said in L2, so if for every formula ϕ1 of L1 there is
a formula ϕ2 of L2 with the same meaning. In other words, we can define expressivity
in the following way.
Definition 1.1. A logic L2 is at least as expressive as a logic L1 if for every formula
ϕ1 of L1 there is an equivalent formula ϕ2 of L2.
Definitions equivalent to the above one2 can be found in many different publica-
tions, including for example [Emerson and Halpern, 1986, Rabinovich, 1992, Hirshfeld
and Rabinovich, 2006, van Ditmarsch et al., 2007, Kooi, 2007, Renne, 2008, A˚gotnes
et al., 2010, Hunter, 2013, Wa´ng, 2013] among many others.
There are four things that are important to note about this definition. Firstly, the
word “equivalent” in Definition 1.1 should be read as “having the same truth value in
every (pointed) model.” So we require both L1 and L2 to have models and semantics,
and furthermore we require that L1 and L2 have the same class of models. The second
thing is that L1  L2 is equivalent to there being a translation t from L1 to L2, namely
the function t that maps the L1 formula ϕ1 onto the equivalent L2 formula ϕ2.3 The
third thing to note is that  is reflexive and transitive (and therefore a preorder)
but not total. For many logics L1 and L2 there are L1 formulas for which there is
no equivalent L2 formula as well as L2 formulas for which there is no equivalent L1
formula. In those cases we have L1 6 L2 and L2 6 L1. Finally we should note that
we only consider relative expressivity; we have defined what it means for a logic L2 to
be at least as expressive as a logic L1. We have not defined the absolute expressivity
e(L) of a single logic L. The reason for only defining  but not e(L) is quite simple;
we know how to define  but not how to define e(L).
1Or expressive power, or expressiveness. These three terms are used interchangeably.
2Or at least: equivalent to a restriction of Definition 1.1 to some domain. Sometimes expressivity
is defined in such a way that only logics of a certain kind can be compared.
3This translation t need not be computable.
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Because of our lack of an absolute definition we must make do with the relative
definition. Fortunately, it turns out that relative expressivity is quite interesting. In
order to support this claim that relative expressivity is interesting let us spend a few
paragraphs considering what expressivity can do for us.
By being a measure of what can be expressed in a logic, expressivity is also to
some extent a measure of the versatility or perhaps even usefulness of a logic. If L2
is at least as expressive than L1 then whenever we use L1 we could, in theory, use
L2 instead. If we want to determine whether an L1 formula ϕ1 is true in a particular
model we can instead check whether the equivalent L2 formula ϕ2 holds there. If
we want to determine whether ϕ1 is satisfiable we can instead check whether ϕ2 is
satisfiable. If some complicated (or simple) bit of reasoning can be represented in L1
then it can be represented in L2 as well.
We should stress that the ability of L2 to replace L1 might be only theoretical. In
order for L2 to be at least as expressive as L1 it is sufficient that for every L1 formula
ϕ1 an equivalent L2 formula ϕ2 exists, we do not have to be able to compute ϕ2.4
And even if we can compute ϕ2 it is possible that ϕ2 is much longer than ϕ1 or harder
to read than ϕ1, and the satisfiability or model checking problems of L2 may have a
much higher computational complexity than that of L1. Still, if we only care about
what a logic can represent and not about how efficiently the logic does so, expressivity
is a very useful tool that helps us compare logics. As an example let us consider the
expressivity of three simple logics.
Example 1.1. Suppose we want to use logic to formalize the sentences “Alice is either
hungry or tired” and “If Alice is tired then, necessarily, she is not hungry.” There are
many logics we could choose to formalize these sentences but suppose that for some
reason we have narrowed down our choice to the following three logics.
• Lp, a classical propositional logic with the connectives ¬,∨,∧,→ and ↔.
• L{¬,∧}, a classical propositional logic with the connectives ¬ and ∧.
• Lm, a basic modal logic with the connectives ¬,∨,∧,→,↔ and .
For technical reasons we assume that all three logics are evaluated on Kripke models,
even though the relational structure of such models is only relevant for Lm. We can
now start to formalize the first sentence. This is most straightforwardly done in Lp,
where we can formalize it as h ∨ t. But we could formalize it in either of the other
logics as well. In L{¬,∧} we could, slightly awkwardly, formalize it as ¬(¬h ∧ ¬t) and
in Lm we could formalize it as h∨ t just like in Lp. It is of course no coincidence that
L{¬,∧} and Lm can formalize the sentence as well. After all, for every formula in Lp
there are equivalent L{¬,∧} and Lm formulas. If an Lp formula ϕ formalizes a given
sentence S then the equivalent L{¬,∧} and Lm formulas also formalize S.
But now let us look at the second sentence, “If Alice is tired then, necessarily, she
is not hungry.” This sentence can be formalized in Lm as t→ ¬h.5 But there is no
way to formalize this sentence in either of the two other logics.
Everything that can be expressed in Lp can also be expressed in L{¬,∧} and Lm.
So L{¬,∧} and Lm are at least as expressive as Lp. It is easy to see that, likewise,
4Although usually we can in fact compute ϕ2.
5One could also argue that the correct formalization is (t → ¬h) instead of t → ¬h. Which
formalization we choose is unimportant for the matter at hand; with either choice the sentence can
be formalized in Lm but not in the two other logics.
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Lp is at least as expressive as L{¬,∧}. This means that Lp and L{¬,∧} are equally
expressive. On the other hand, there are things that can be expressed in Lm that
cannot be expressed in Lp. So Lm is (strictly) more expressive than Lp. In the end, if
we wish to formalize both sentences we have no choice but to use Lm; neither of the
other logics is expressive enough.
One important thing to note about this example is that we used expressivity to
determine which logic is most appropriate for our needs: if we want to formalize “If
Alice is tired then, necessarily, she is not hungry” then a basic propositional logic will
not suffice but a modal logic will. So expressivity can be a reason to prefer one logic
over another.
Expressivity is of course not the only reason why we could prefer one logic over
another. We could prefer L2 over L1 because it has more intuitive or natural semantics,
because its decision problems have a better computational complexity or because it is
more succinct. But expressivity does to some extent have a privileged position among
these reasons. Suppose the semantics of L1 are rather unintuitive, perhaps because
the only connective it has is the Sheffer stroke. Then we can still use L1, although
it will take some effort. Suppose then that the decision problems of L1 have a high
computational complexity. That might be a serious problem if we want to determine
whether or not some large formula is valid. But generally we will still be able to reason
about simple formulas. If L1 is not expressive enough we cannot even do that. If we
want to reason about, say, necessity, knowledge, time or action, a basic propositional
logic will be completely useless; even the simplest sentences regarding these concepts
cannot be formalized in a logic that is not expressive enough.
Still, despite the somewhat privileged position of expressivity we should not forget
that there are other criteria for preferring one logic over another. These other criteria
are worthy of study, just like expressivity. Studying them is outside the scope of this
thesis though, as one might expect given its title.
Now that we are on the subject of the title of this thesis it may be worthwhile
to explain why we are considering the expressivity of logics of knowledge and action
instead of other logics. The main reason for looking at logics of knowledge and action
is that there are many of them that use the same class of models. We can only apply
Definition 1.1 to logics that share a class of models, so a large set of logics with the
same class of models is a very good place to look for interesting expressivity results.
Of course logics of knowledge and action are not the only area where a lot of logics
use the same models. Another such area is temporal logic, and it is no coincidence that
the expressivity of temporal logics has also been studied extensively (most famously
in [Kamp, 1968]).
Remark. Above I mentioned that we do not have a good definition for the absolute
expressivity e(L) of a logic L. But even if we would manage to find such a definition
that would not help us much, since we would have no hope of exactly determining the
value of e(L) for a specific logic L.
The expressivity e(L) of a logic L should be the set of those things that can be
expressed in a logic. In order to properly define e we would therefore first have to
determine the category C of things that could possibly be expressed, and what it
means for a logic to express some c ∈ C. Finding this C would be hard, perhaps even
impossible. Worse, even if we were to find this C we would still be unable to determine
the exact expressivity of a logic.
In the example we used logics to express the two sentences “Alice is either hungry
or tired” and “If Alice is tired then, necessarily, she is not hungry.” There is nothing
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special about these sentences, we could have taken any other declarative sentences and
asked whether the logics can express those sentences. This means that C must include,
possibly in addition to other things, all declarative sentences in natural language. But
natural language is too imprecise for us to have any hope of determining exactly which
sentences can be expressed in a logic and which cannot.
1.2 Outline of this Thesis
This thesis consists of two parts. The first part contains expressivity results, the
second part results that are not themselves expressivity results6 but that are related
to expressivity.
Part I consists of Chapters 2 and 3. In Chapter 2 we compare the logic LCP
(an epistemic logic with common knowledge and public announcements) to a logic
LCPS (an epistemic logic with common knowledge, public announcements and public
substitutions). Of these two logics it was already known from [Kooi, 2007] that LCPS
is more expressive than LCP over the class K of models. We show that LCPS is also
more expressive than LCP over the classes KD45, S4 and S5 of models, if the set of
agents is large enough.
In Chapter 3 we consider a large number of logics, most notably LR (epistemic
logic with relativized common knowledge), LCU (epistemic logic with common knowl-
edge and arrow updates) and LU∗ (epistemic logic with arrow common knowledge). I
show that LU∗ is more expressive than LR. Additionally, I show that LCU is equally
expressive as LU∗ . The proof of this second claim is extremely long, technical and
complicated. Many of the details are therefore given not in Chapter 3 but in the
appendix.
Part II consists of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. In it we consider a number of results
that are not themselves expressivity results but that are closely related to questions of
expressivity. In Chapter 4 we look at Arbitrary Public Announcement Logic (APAL)
and ask whether the arbitrary public announcement operator ♦ in that logic is truly
arbitrary. In the end we conclude that it is not, in fact, truly arbitrary. The formulas
and models used in the proof that ♦ is not fully arbitrary are very similar to those used
in expressivity proofs. This is no coincidence; the fact that ♦ is not fully arbitrary
depends strongly on the fact that APAL is more expressive than Public Announcement
Logic (PAL), which was shown to be the case in [Balbiani et al., 2007].
In Chapter 5 we look at a number of deontic logics, logics intended to reason about
obligations and permissions. But we do not compare the expressivity of these logics.
Instead we investigate whether certain sentences can be expressed in particular logics.
As mentioned in the remark in the previous section we cannot determine the exact set
of sentences that can be expressed in a logic. We can however choose a few specific
sentences and check whether those can be expressed in a particular logic. Specifically,
in Chapter 5 we investigate whether any deontic logic that is based on the idea of a
single “sanction” representing wrongdoing is capable of expressing a certain type of
obligation called a contrary-to-duty obligation. We conclude that none of the logics
under consideration have the tools required to represent such obligations.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we try to generalize expressivity. Recall that a logic L2 is at
least as expressive as a logic L1 if for every formula ϕ1 of L1 there is an equivalent
formula ϕ2 of L2, and that the word “equivalent” should be read as “having the same
6So these results do not show that L1  L2 or that L1 6 L2 for any logics L1 and L2.
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truth value on every pointed model”. So the formula ϕ2 must be such that for every
pointed modelM, w we haveM, w |= ϕ1 if and only ifM, w |= ϕ2. But that means we
cannot compare the expressivity of logics that have different classes of models. There
are very good reasons for restricting expressivity in this way; if we carelessly generalize
expressivity to allow different models we risk ending up with a trivial concept where
almost all logics are as expressive as almost all other logics.
Still, a number of interesting results have been published that have strong sim-
ilarities to expressivity results, even though they compare logics that have different
models. This suggests that there is some generalization of expressivity that is nontriv-
ial and interesting. In Chapter 6 we try to find a generalization of expressivity that
covers these interesting results. Because we are generalizing a formal concept, instead
of proving things about an existing formal concept, this chapter is more speculative
than the other chapters.
1.3 Previous Work
Several of the chapters in this thesis are based on previously published papers. Specifi-
cally, Chapter 2 is based on the paper “The Expressivity of Factual Change in Dynamic
Epistemic Logic” [Kuijer, 2014b], which appeared in the Review of Symbolic Logic.
Chapter 3 is based on the paper “The Expressivity of Update Logic” [Kuijer, to ap-
pear], which is to appear in the Journal of Logic and Computation.7 Chapter 4 is
based on the paper “How Arbitrary are Arbitrary Public Announcements?”[Kuijer,
2013] which was presented at the student session of ESSLLI 2013. An extended version
[Kuijer, 2014a] of that paper also appeared in a collection of selected papers from the
ESSLLI 2012 and ESSLLI 2103 student sessions. Finally, Chapter 5 is based on the
paper “Sanction Semantics and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations” [Kuijer, 2012], which
was presented at the 11th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer
Science.
The structure of the papers that these chapters are based on has, mostly, been
preserved. This should allow most of the chapters of this thesis to be read separately.
In particular, every chapter is self-contained in the sense that it contains all definitions
that are needed in that chapter.
7The electronic version of [Kuijer, to appear] is already available at
http://logcom.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/09/04/logcom.exu047.
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